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The ability of imperialist nations to infiltrate and impose their
values and desires on newly independent nations on the continent of Africa
should never be underestimated. While the more vulgar means of control,
such as direct rule and colonization have been relinquished in the 20th
century, newer aspects of aggression are covered up, hidden and filed
under the concept "neo-colonialism". In clear terms, all aspects of
imperialism are not unmasked. The problem then becomes what "game" will
the capitalist nations use next to continue their control over African
nations. It can be suggested that if not assured of continued support in
Africa by those leaders and regimes hand-picked and held up by Western
imperialism, these Western powers may resort to the use of a "third" force
to insure and secure their control of the continent.
In 1967 the Africa Research Group published a pamphlet on exactly one
of these "third" forces; namely Israel. It analyzed the impact that Israel
has had on African nations. The Group asserts that the role Israel has
played in Africa is a relatively invisible but strategically important one
for the United States' organized free world empire. Thus, it is not sur
prising that the Group should discover:
U. S. imperialism uses Israeli diplomatic military and develop
ment institutions to further its own objectives of tying post
independence Africa to the West and undermining revolutionary
1
movements which threaten Western hegemony. Israel's own long
range political and economic goals have been strengthened by
foreign aid-programmes in at least 15 African countries.'
Israel shares the unique distinction, together with a handful of
other nations, of being a "newsworthy" country. Various references to
Israel are made daily in both Western and Eastern presses. On a per
capita basis, no other country receives as much world press coverage as
Israel. However, very few articles and fewer books present a competent
analysis of Israel's foreign policy and its role in world politics. And
if the area of concentration is narrowed to Israel's involvement with
Africa, the paucity of first—rate work is even more evident.
Consequently, an attempt will be made to assess the literature on
Israeli relations with Africa with a special emphasis on Israeli aid to
Africa.
Such Western writers as M. Z. Frank, Walter Schwartz, Leo Kohn and
Hanen Yavor have done extensive work in the area of Israeli foreign rela
tions. In general, these authors have done studies on Israel's role in
the Third World. For example, M. Z. Frank did a very intensive study on
2
Israeli aid in his article "Israel's Afro-Asian Bridge." Like Schwart's
•a
"Israel Goes Afro-Asian", Frank's article attempted to place the role
that Israel is playing in developing countries in a very positive light.
He portrays Israel as a small, benevolent nation which dispenses aid to
Africa Research Group, "David and Goliath Collaborate in Africa,"
p. 5. Reprinted from Tri Continental, (November 15» 1969).
M. Z. Frank, "Israel's Afro-Asian Bridge." New Leader (London)
March 7, I960.
Walter Schwartz, "Israel Goes Afro-Asian," The Spectator, (London)
January, 1959.
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poor, underdeveloped areas with no strings attached.
As would be expected, there have been frequent references to Israel's
African policy in the Israeli domestic press. Most of these works, how
ever, are in Hebrew. Ehud Avriel, the former Israeli Ambassador to Ghana
and David Horowitz, President of the Bank of Israel have done studies on
Israel's role in Africa. One could view for instance, Avriel's article
in the Jerusalem Post (daily) of September 30, I960. This article, coupled
with his analysis of Israel's relations with Africa and Asia and Horowitz's
"Israel and the Developing Nations" all serve to highlight positive aspects
of Israeli aid to the Third World. In most of his writings, Avriel at
tempts to align Israel with the Third World in general and Africa in par
ticular. At one time, he was one of the most influential people in Ghana
and it was rumored that he often dictated domestic and foreign policy
decisions to Nkrumah.
Yitzhak Artzi and Victor Cygielman have concluded in their studies
on Israeli foreign policy that Israel is attempting to portray a new image
in Africa. Commenting on the need of Israel to find allies in the Third
World, both authors conclude that Israel must break some of its ties with
the West and align itself closer with the ambitions of developing states.
See for example, Ehud Avriel, "Israel's Interest in New Africa,"
Jerusalem Post (daily) September 30, I960; "Israel, Africa and Asia,"
Israel Economist (Tel Aviv) July, 1961; "Israel's Relations with Africa
and Asia," Israel Economist, July, 1962. David Horowitz, "Israel and the
Developing Nations," Jerusalem Post Weekly, December 3» 1965.
5See W. Scott Thompson's Ghana's Foreign Policy: 1957-1966 (Prince
ton, 1969), pp. 48-58.




Cygielman, "Can Israel go Neutralist?" New Outlook. October,
k
Another factor in Israel's foreign policy changes is its relations
with South Africa. Several decisions to vote along with the African
nations in condemning Israel brought sharp criticism for Israel by South
Africa.
Richard Stevens of Lincoln University, has done some of the most
ambitious work to date on Israeli-South African relations. Although it
has been pointed out that Israel began to alter its policies toward South
Africa after it gained close ties with other African states; Stevens
points to the closeness of the original relationship.
Going beyond the position of other countries that are
favorable to Israel, Mai an not only permitted Jewish
reserve officers to serve in Israel, a procedure offi
cially contrary to law, but he became the first Prime
Minister in the British Commonwealth to pay a courtesy
visit to the new state. When, despite serious financial
problems then facing South Africa, the government per
mitted the exports of much needed commodities and currency
to Israel, Malan's victory with the Jewish community was
complete.
Thereafter, the Jewish South African community would send
more money per capita to Israel than any Jewish group in
the world.8
In general, the published material on Israel's programmes of tech
nical cooperation with Africa is more extensive than the general Israeli
African foreign relations material. The Department of International Co
operation in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel publishes vol
uminous official documents every year. Colored with a pro-Israeli govern
ment line, these reports and documents include topics on the following
areas: Trainees in Israel in the year 1961 (1962); Programme of Coopera-
Q
Richard P. Stevens, "Zionism, South Africa and Aparthied: The
Paradoxical Triangle," Phylon (Second Quarter. 1971), 17-18.
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Hnn with Country, of East Africa (1962); Israel's Programme for Train
ing Opportunities (1962); Programme for Itinerat Courses in Africa (1962);
*nH T^ael's Programme of International Co-operation (1971).
One of the best organized studies on the Israeli programmes is
Mordechai *~^n'c T«r»ft1 and Africa; A Study in Technical Co-operation.
The book contains chapters on such facets of Israeli technical assistance
as youth organization, health, joint companies and labor organization.
However, the author strongly supports a pro-Zionist line throughout the
work. Attempting to present Israel in a favorable light, Kreinin has
written that Israel's absence of colonial ambition is an "enabling con
dition." However, without a content of social values and technical
skills, it would not be sufficient to attract the interest of African
government. He also states that perhaps the first phenomenon which
catches the eye of visiting delegations to Israel is the non-dogmatic
socialism evolved by the Jewish community in Palestine and continued in
Israel. At the same time, they recognize the need to encourage any pri-
9
vate (domestic or foreign) initiative that might emerge.
The establishment of national agrarian centered, youth organizations
aimed at the promotion of civic consciousness has been one of the major
emphases of Israel's programmes of technical co-operation. These organi
zations titled Nachal and Gadna were transferred to over a dozen nations
during the early '60's. Possibly the most comprehensive coverage of these
Israeli structures is to be found in articles written by C. Rossillion
9Mordechai E. Kreinin, Israel and Africa-. A Study in Technical
Cooperation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 5.
10C. Rossillion, "Economic and Social Work for Young People During
Defense Service: The Israeli Formula," Tntsmational Labor Review (Geneva)
(January, 1966), 66-79.
and Irving Hegmont. Both authors give a detailed study of these youth
movements and their possible impact on African states.
Limiting the study of the Nachal-Gadna programmes to Ghana; several
works have been written. What was to become a Ghanaian hybrid of the
12
Israeli Nachal is briefly noted in an article by Colin Legum. Peter
Hodge analyzes the Ghanaian organization in much greater depth in his
article. Hodge asserts that the Ghanaian model served as a useful force
in Ghana for the orientation of youth.
Trade union cooperation and the mass training of many African union
leaders is yet another project stressed by Israel. The Histadrut model,
widely admired in the developing countries has served as a model for the
reorganization of certain trade union federations in these countries. The
best works in these areas include Samuel Decalo's dissertation, "Israel
and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation—A Study of Foreign Policy and
Technical Assistance." This is a well organized work which explains
the nature of Israeli aid in African nations with particular emphasis on
the role that imperialism plays. Another important, although somewhat un
coordinated work is Joseph Churba's doctoral dissertation, "U.A.R.—Israel
^Irving Hegmont, "The Israeli Nachal Program." Middle East Journal,
(Summer, 1967), 31 **-2k.
12Colin Legum, "Ghana Starts Builders Brigade," Jerusalem Post,
December 22, 1957.
13Peter Hodge, "The Ghana Workers Brigade," British Journal of Soci
ology (June, 1964).
^Samuel Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation—
A Study of Foreign Policy and Technical Assistance," Doctoral Disserta
tion. (University of Pennsylvania, 1967).
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Rivalry Over Aid and Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa."
Samuel Decalo has done a well written account of the total Israeli-
African aid structure. Running 15 pages and listing all of the material
up until 1967 on Israeli aid to Africa, Decalo gives insight into the
literature published on this subject during 1958-67. For a sample of his
writings on the subject it would be useful to read his bibliography. At
the present time, it holds the wealth of information and directives to
scholars who are seriously interested in the Middle East and Africa in
general and Israeli-African relations in particular.
All in all, Israeli diplomatic efforts in Africa between 1956-70
brought about an immense improvement in the international position of
Israel. The growing amity for Israel on the part of Africa, had by 1958
grown tremendously. For example, Afro-Israeli cooperation in the United
Nations appreciably dulled Arab anti-Israel propaganda in that organiza
tion. By 1961, a number of important resolutions sponsored by countries
from the Third World with a significant African participation called for
direct negotiations in the Middle East. Even more important is the fact
that by 1966 Israel found herself elected to a number of executive posi
tions in United Nations agencies as the representative of the whole of Afro-
Asia. Needless to say, such cooperation has not been one-sided. Israel
has had to modify certain of her positions on African affairs.
This thesis is an attempt to analyze the role that the Israeli aid
programmes, both technical and military, have played in two African nations,
15Joseph Churba, "U.A.R.—Israeli Rivalry Over Aid and Trade in Sub-
Saharan Africa," Doctoral Dissertation (Columbia University, 1965).
Samuel Decalo, "Israel and Africa: A Selected Bibliography,"
The Journal of Modern African Studies. V (1967), 385-99.
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Ghana and Uganda. The basic hypothesis of this thesis is that Israel is
used as a go-between or buffer for imperialist nations vis-a-vis the
Third World. In the specific case of Africa, Israel has been effectively
used by Western nations in setting up closer ties between African nations
and Western powers.
In an attempt to devise a framework for explaining the nature of the
Israeli aid programme in Africa specifically and in the Third World in
general, three major premises will be examined:
1. Israeli aid to Africa was and is an instrument of Western
imperialism. The guiding principle being that Western coun
tries finance programmes through Israel to Third World nations.
2. Israel's general interest in African nations is grounded in
the need to find political allies in the Third World, and at
the same time, discredit the Arab nations so that African
states would give support to Israel in the Middle East con
flict.
3. Israel's aid programme in Africa helps the Israeli economy.
In citing several reasons why Israel has ventured upon such a broad
technical and military programme in the Third World in general one author
notes that:
In 1967, Israel Companies carried construction and public works
in the developing counties to the tune of $55 million. Of
course, such large—scale activity stimulated the export of
Israel's products, particularly building materials, to the
countries where work was being executed. Israel's exports
to developing nations rose from $50 million in 1961 to $11^
million in 1967. While admitting that these business ventures
were profitable to Israel, the author took pains to note that
these ventures were by no means a decisive element in Israel's
policy.17
This thesis will take opposition with this general view and will at
tempt to show that Israel's role in Africa was beneficial to the Israeli
David Horowitz, "Israel and Africa," (Special Pamphlet), January
I960. Cited in Israel's Programmed for Training Opportunities (Jerusalem:
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1962), p. 37.
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economy and a decisive factor in the origin of the aid programme.
A considerable amount of literature has been written on Israeli
aid to developing nations. However, there is little work on the impact of
Israeli aid to the policies of African nations. And, there is no sys
tematic study of Israeli aid programmes in specific countries in the
Third World.
The nations considered in this study are Ghana and Uganda. The
reason for using these two nations is to show the divergent policies
Israel employed in different nations in Africa.
Ghana is used because it was the first Black nation on the continent
to break away from colonial rule. The role that Ghana played in Africa's
emerging independence must be attributed to the leadership of Kwame
Nkrumah; the nation's first President. Through his writings reflecting
the ideals of freedom and anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was often looked upon
as the spokesman for African unity. Not only was Ghana the first Afri
can nation to set up an aid programme with Israel, but the impact of this
programme radiated to other African nations. Therefore, we will have two
aspects to consider vis-a-vis Israeli aid. First of all the personality
of Kwame Nkrumah, secondly the role of Ghana's aid programme with Israel.
This thesis will limit its inquiry of Ghana to the years of the Nkrumah
administration. This is important because the Israelis had a pronounced
influence throughout Africa during this period (1958-1965).
Uganda is the second nation that will be examined in this study.
Notwithstanding the contemporary role that President Idi Amin has played
in world and African politics; Israel and Uganda up until 1971 had strong
ties. It is interesting to scrutinize Israeli-Ugandan relations because
it will focus on not one but two distinct African personalities. Former
10
President Milton Obote and President Idi Amin Dada will be examined in
the role that they served in the Israeli aid structure. At one time
Uganda was considered a suitable place for the restoration of the Jewish
people and this factor makes it interesting to view Israeli relations with
Uganda. It should also be noted that Uganda does have a sizeable Moslem
population and Israel's entry in this area could have been viewed as a
hammer blow to Arab states.
This study constitutes an historical inquiry. A thorough survey of
the literature on Israeli aid to Africa will be made in order to analyze
and assess the total range of Israel's growing interest in Africa. Books,
articles, newspapers, journals and official documents will be used to
collect data for the study which will attempt to show the linkages be
tween Israeli aid and world imperialism.
CHAPTER II
ZIONISM: AN ARM OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM
The birth of the Zionist State of Israel in May of 19*f8 was fostered
in the origin of the political Zionist movement which swept Europe in the
last decade of the 19th century. To be sure, this form of Zionism dif
fered from other aspects of the ideology. While most Zionists were cal
ling for any geographic area in the world for Jewish settlement; the new
leaders of Zionism totally rejected this idea. The unique factor in this
new movement was that there was only one solution to the problem of the
Jewish people, that being: the establishment in Palestine of an exclus
ively Jewish State.
The initial success of Zionism can be traced directly to the economic,
political and ideological conditions existing in Europe at the end of the
nineteenth century. Arie Bober has pointed out some significant aspects
of Zionism and several of his points are worth noting here.
Economically, in the less industrialized countries like Poland and
Russia, there were new social stresses that were coming to fore. These
forces arose from the rapid development of capitalism and the decay of
the Austrian and Russian empires. These factors led to the uprooting of
the Jews from their traditional occupations. The Jews became the scape
goat in the declining feudal systems to divert the peasants1 hostilities
into channels of racial persecution. These processes resulted in a huge
11
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wave of Jewish immigration from eastern and central Europe—some five mil
lion immigrated to America and other areas, a few thousand went to Pales
tine. At the same time in western Europe, where Jews were mostly merchants
and members of the middle class the pressures of economic competition made
it increasingly difficult for them to integrate into local bourgeois soci
ety and forced them to create their own institutions.
Politically, the capitalist development of nineteen-century Europe
brought to the fore two distinct political phenomena; one was nationalism
and the other was the quest for colonization of the underdeveloped conti
nents. Zionism arose and took shape under the influence of these two
phenomena. It was the nationalist response to the problem created by per
secution of the Jews. It also proposed to create a national Jewish state
2
by colonizing underdeveloped territory.
Ideologically, these two objectives were to be reflected in the con
sciousness of many East European Jews in a distinctive national ideology.
The new ideology was able to incorporate and secularize an element of the
traditional religious belief of the Jews—the messianic expectation of
the ingathering of the exiles in Palestine.
The founder of the modern day Zionist movement was Theodor Herzl; an
Austrian Jew. Herzl grew up and received his high school training in
Budapest. At the age of eighteen, his family moved to Vienna where he
enrolled in the University. Upon gaining his doctorate in 1884, he prac-
Arie Bober, ed., The Other Israel; The Radical Case Against Zionism





ticed law for one year and then gave up law to devote his time to writing.
He soon became well known as a famous journalist. His appointment in
1892 to the staff of the Neue Freie Presse, the most important Viennese
newspaper, marked the beginning of his Zionist leadership.
As the resident correspondent to Paris for the newspaper; Herzl was
shocked by the 189^ Alfred Dreyfus affair. Dreyfus, a Jewish Captain
serving with the French General Staff was accused of spying for the
1+
Germans. Herzl had the task of relating the Dreyfus trial to his paper
in Vienna. In his book, The Zionist Idea. Arthur Hertzberg examined the
effect of the outcome of the trial on Herzl.
He was present at the Ecole Militaire at the famous dramatic
scene when Dreyfus was stripped of his epulets and drummed
out of the gate in disgrace. For Herzl this moment was a
hammer blow, and the howling of the mob outside the parade
ground shouting "a bas les jifs" transformed him into the
Zionist he was to be.5
In I896, Herzl published Per Judenstat (The Jewish State). In the
preface he wrote: "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is
an ancient one. It is the restoration of the Jewish State." Throughout
this work, Hetzi asserted the basic need for a Jewish State. He appar
ently regarded the idea as an excellent one. Convinced that Jews could
not receive justice and equality in the nations of the world; he steadily
pursued the idea of a separate, distinct Jewish nation.
Herzl believed that the Jews could never achieve such a dream without
4
Dreyfus was given a verdict of guilty to the charges of spying for
the Germans. Herzl's entire portrayal of the trial to his newspaper was
one of an act of direct discrimination and persecution of the Jewish
people by the French.
Arthur Hetzberg, ed., The Zionist Idea (New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1959), p. 202.
6Ibid., p. 202.
the help of outsiders. Thus he points out:
To create a new State is neither ridiculous nor impossible.
Haven't we witnessed the process in our own day among other
nations which were not largely middle class as we are, but
poorer, less educated, and consequently weaker than our
selves? The government of all countries scourged by anti-
semitism will be keenly interested in obtaining sovereignty
for us.7
In his conclusion, he cited two places which the Jews might find
suitable for settlement. The first was Argentina. For his part, Herzl
believed that the Republic of Argentina should cede a portion of its
Q
territory to the Jews. He requested an interview with Baron Maurice de
Hirsch, the founder of the Jewish Colonization Society in Argentina.
Receiving very little support for this idea from de Hirsch; Herzl focused
upon his second alternative: the establishment of the Jewish State in
Palestine. Thus Herzl writes:
Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland. The very
name would be a marvelously effective rallying cry. If His
Majesty the Sultan, were to give us Palestine, we would in
return undertake the complete management of the finances of
Turkey. We should there form a part of a wall of defense
for Europe in Asia, an outpost for civilization against bar
barism. We should as a neutral state remain in contact with
Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence.9
In order, therefore, to understand how the Zionist dream of a Jewish
7Ibid., p. 220.
Q
As regards Argentina, Herzl once remarked, "Argentina is one of
the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, is
sparsely populated, and has a temperate climate. It would be in its own
interest for the Republic of Argentina to cede us its territory. The
present infiltration of Jews has certainly produced some discontent, and
it would be necessary to enlighten the Republic on the intrinsic dif
ferences of the new immigration of Jews." Cited in Hertzberg, The Zion
ist Idea, p. 222.
9Ibid.. p. 222.
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state in Palestine became a reality, it is necessary to understand the
relationship between Zionism and western imperialism and the great poten
tial and ability of the Zionists to court western powers.
Since its inception, the general guiding principle of Zionist diplo
macy was to associate itself with the world power within whose sphere
of influence Palestine happened to be. Herzel was mainly interested
in gaining the support of the Turkish Sultan and the German Kaiser.
Once Palestine became a British mandate after World War I; Zionists
courted British imperialism. After the Second World War, the orienta
tion of Zionism was bent toward the interest of the United States.
Before his death in 190*t, Herzl was to resound the words that would in
fact be a reality in 19*$: "The world needs the Jewish State, therefore,
it will arise."12
Although there were certain factions of Jews who differed over the
practical policy and ideology that Zionism would entail; all factions
agreed to be silent on the question of Jewish sovereignty itself and the
political means to achieve it. The urgent political task in the 1880's
Bober, _0£. cjjt., p. 37.
Ibid., p. 56.
12
Marvin Lowenthal, ed., The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York:
The Dial Press, 1956), p. 27.
^Richard Stevens points out that in 1882 three Zionists inspired
groups arrived in Palestine from Rumania and Poland. He stated that
immediately there developed a conflict between Zionist ideology and the
Western European Jewish-sponsored operations. "Although Western Jews
and political Zionists came to terms on some issues relating to the
strengthening, expansion and development of Jewish settlements in Pales
tine, serious if not bitter divisions developed in other areas. Richard
P. Stevens, Zionism and Palestine Before The Mandate: A Phase of Western
Imperialism (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), pp.
7-8.
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and «90's was one which fell far short of the Zionist ideal and yet was
fundamental to the activities of both Eastern Zionists and the Western
Jews: merely to keep the doors of Palestine open to Jewish immigrants
and to procure the right to buy land and settle it. All were agreed in
their willingness to adopt any legal or semi-legal arrangement or sub-
terfuge that would accomplish these ends in the Ottoman Empire.
The mere fact that Palestine itself was already populated by Arabs
hardly figured in the early discussions of political Zionism. At the
First World Zionist Congress held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897; the
Zionists gathered from all over the world to discuss the plan for a
Jewish State. Prior to this time, Herzl had not faltered in his efforts
to engage upon enlisting imperial German and Russian support? Herzl was
convinced that in terms of success: "the most suitable personage would
be the German Kaiser." "But", he remarked, "I must have help if I am to
carry out the task."15 Elected president of the World Zionist Organiza
tion, Herzl's ideas emerged in a resolution calling for a publicly recog
nized, legally secured state in Palestine.
Because Palestine was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and at a
time when Germany was drawing close to the Ottoman Empire; Herzl and other
Zionists felt it imperative to court Germany. As one writer points out:
Following his visit to Constantinople in mid-October, I898 and
a meeting there with Herzl, Kaiser Wilhelm II went on to Pales
tine. Although the trip was ostensibly undertaken as a religious
pilgrimage, it turned into a political demonstration in tune with
German strategy to penetrate the Near East. However, although
[., p. 10.
15Lowenthal, 0£. cit,., p. 105.
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Herzl accompanied the royal party and entertained high hopes
of German support, it soon became apparent that such a scheme
was beyond German /sic/ capability.'5
The fact that Germany lacked the power to complete the designs of
the Zionists proved only to the Zionists that they should find greener
political pastures. What Germany could not do or failed to do, Great
Britain was willing to try. Thus Zionism found a willing partner in its
plan to rob the Palestinians of their land. Becoming increasingly alarmed
by the large influx of Jewish refugees to England from Russia, the British
government sought to examine the question of alien immigration. In 1898,
the British government was presided over by Arthur Balfour. Herzl immedi
ately petitioned Balfour and Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary
for an audience to explain his plan for a Jewish state. Herzl found
Chamberlain receptive, for indeed, Chamberlain admitted that he was willing
to help if he could. "If I could show him a spot among the British posses
sions which was not yet inhabited by white settlers, then we could talk,"
Herzl remarked of Chamberlain.
18
Chamberlain advanced the Zionist cause by proposing Uganda for Jew
ish settlement. To this proposal Herzl replied that as far as the Jews
Stevens, Zionism and Palestine. . . ., p. 13.
17Lowenthal, Op., cvt., p. 375.
Vie Zionists insisted that the Jews reside in Palestine. It was
generally felt that Uganda would be too hot for white settlement. This
matter continuously plagued Ugandan-Israeli relations in the 1960's when
an East African visitor to Israel told Ben-Gurion that it was a good
thing that the Jews did not implement their plans to settle in Uganda:
"otherwise the Jews would have been kicked out now."
18
were concerned, the Zionist base "must be in or near Palestine. Later on
we could also settle in Uganda, for we have great masses of human beings
19
ready to immigrate."
Although Palestine was already inhabited by a large Arab popula
tion,20 this fact held little significance to the Zionists. In fact,
when Max Nordau, Herzl's second in command first received details on the
existence of an Arab population in Palestine he came shocked to Herzl,
21
exclaiming, "I never realized this, we are commiting an injustice."
At the beginning of the century when Zionists began to pour into
Palestine, the fact that the country was already populated could no longer
be ignored. The Jewish National Fund began purchasing land in 1905 and
in 1908 the Palestine office was opened in Jaffa. Samuel Decalo gives
an excellent example of the situation between Jews in the Holy Land and
that of the Zionists immigrating to the area:
Prior to the arrival of the first wave of pioneers, the Jewish
settlement in Palestine was composed of small, semi-detached,
pious communities largely content with living an apolitical
devout life in the Holy Land. Their pattern of life was rudely
shattered by the arrival of ideological motivated (rather than
religiously inspired) and action-oriented young settlers who,
within a short span of time, transformed the social ethos of
the land. Between 1882 and 191* the Jewish population in
Palestine grew from 3^,000 to 85,000. After the First WoMd
War there were three more waves of migration, by 1939 an addi
tional 310,000 settlers came to Palestine."
^Stevens, Op., cvt., p. 383«
20Although figures vary, it is estimated that shortly before the
First World War, the Jewish population in Palestine was around 100,000;
wMle the non!jewish community consisted of 63O,OOO of whom 550,000 were
Arab Palestinians.
21Cited in Bober, The Other Israel, p. 37
22Samuel Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation,"
p. k7.
19
During these years, the Jews began to gain a great upperhand over
the ownership of the land and proclaimed that:
... the Jews, by race and origin an eastern people and
by experience and skills a part of the west, were except
ionally qualified to bring the stagnant east into the orbit
of western civilization. Zionism was introducing a dynamic
impulse into Palestine which promised to infuse new life into
the entire Near East.23
Unlike other European settlers whose main interests were to enter
the colonies and exploit the riches of the area along with the indige
nous labor; the Zionists sought to create (through immigration) its own
working class by replacing Arabs with Jews. The Zionists interest in
the resources of the area was an equally important factor. Yet the
prime motivation was to establish an exclusive Jewish state and Jewish
control of the land mass; which in reality would be cloaked and sheltered
by western nations.
In the United States, Zionists were receiving strong support from
such leaders as Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Brandeis, him
self a Jew and an outspoken Zionist wrote many articles about the need
for America to support the aims of the Zionists. In his collection of
essays entitled, Brandeis on Zionism, the Supreme Court Justice wrote of
the need for every Jew to realize the goals of the Zionists. He also
emphasized the impact that America was beginning to have on the Palestine
question. In referring to the Jewish continued quest for Palestine he
wrote:
What has been accomplished is due primarily to the great cause
which we represent, and to the constant aid and support given us
at home, and abroad by the officials of the United States govern
ment. Without the aid of the Navy Department; it would have been
23Rufus Learsi, Fulfillment: The Epi>. Storv of Zionism. (Cleve
land: World Publishing Co., 1951)» p. 172.
20
impossible to render the assistance which has preserved the
Palestinian colonies and saved our brethren from distress.21*
While in America, the mantle of Zionist leadership fell upon Brandeis,
in Britain it fell upon Dr. Chaim Weizman. For his part, Weizman had
captured the hearts of the British. He had taught Chemistry at the Uni
versity of Manchester; where his scientific attainments were to play an
important part in the British war efforts. In fact, it was during the
outbreak of war in November 1914 that Weizman was to take a very strong
line toward British influence in Palestine. He wrote to the editor of
the Manchester Guardian:
We can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within the
British sphere of influence, and should Britain encourage a
Jewish settlement there as a British dependency, we could
have in twenty to thirty years a million Jews out there
perhaps more? they would develop the country, bring back
civilization to it and form a very effective guard for the
Suez Canal.25
This idea was pressed so hard that it culminated in the Balfour
Declaration of 1917. This Declaration openly showed British approval of
a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine:
His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will
use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.26
It is important to note that the British government insisted upon
Louis D. Brandeis, Brandeis On Zionism (Washington: The Zionist
Organization of America, 19^2), p. 73.
Cited in Hyman Lumer, Zionism: Its Role in World Politics (New
York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 33.
26
Cited in Stevens, Zionism and Palestine. . . ., p. 31.
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a national home instead of a Jewish state. Although the Declaration
fell short of the wishes of Zionist militants; it was accepted and greeted
by Jews as the preliminary to statehood. Thus, the battlecry for Zionists
was to become one of "expulsion" of the Arabs for the settlement of Jews
in Palestine.
After World War I, the Britians received a Mandate over Palestine.
When the new administration in Britain was inaugurated in July of 1920,
His Majesty, King George V sent the following message to the people of
Palestine: "The Allied Powers whose armies were victorious in the last
war have entrusted to my country a Mandate to watch over the interests
of Palestine and to ensure to your country that peaceful and prosperous
28
development which has so long been denied to you."
The Arab population in Palestine correctly interpreted the so called
"peaceful and prosperous development" of their country as a scheme on
the part of Zionists and British officials to secure Palestine for the
Jews. In April 1920, anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem and Jaffa, were
read by the British as mere "disturbances". In the eyes of the Jews,
such retaliations and the cry of "Palestine for the Palestinians" were
interpreted as an age old quest to rid the world of the Jewish population.
With the advent of World War II, which resulted in the massacre of
27
There is a difference. A national homeland would mean in fact,
a place where the Jews could find refuge from oppression and could be
received openly by other Jews and Arabs to live in peace and equality.
The Jewish state meant an exclusive nation for "Jews only": whereby
the rights and privileges of other nationals would be subordinated to
the will of the Jews.
28
Stevens, _0p_. cit., p. hi.
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millions of Jews by Nazi Germany, the calls for an Israeli nation became
louder. Although the British had allowed the Zionists to carry on cam
paigns in Palestine which resulted in such slogans as "Redeem the Land",
"Jewish labor", and "Buy Jewish"; British officials became aware that
they could no longer carry the burden of the Zionists for their Jewish
state. Realizing that the oil fields, the pipelines and the Suez Canal
might fall under German influence, the British produced a white paper
which was aimed at gaining favor with the Arabs. It stated:
His Majesty's government now declares unequivocally that it
is not a part of their policy that Palestine should become
a Jewish state. It should be a state in which the two people
in Palestine, Arabs and Jews share authority in government in
such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.29
Taking these elements into consideration, the Zionists sought other ave
nues of support. They found, in the United States, an eager partner for
their expansionist plans.
With the decline of British influence, a strong Zionist lobby was
set up in Washington, and pro-American elements in World Zionism began to
gain supremacy over the pro-British faction. The War had transformed
the Jewish community in Palestine into a nation with its own economy,
army, political organizations, language and ideology. The Zionist reor-
ientation toward the United States, combined with growing American inter
ests in the Middle East, only served to hasten British disapproval of this
policy and resulted in an all-out Jewish-British confrontation. Britain,
fearing the loss of British control over the area, was thrown into an
armed conflict with the Jewish community in Palestine; whose main purpose
29Cited in Bober, p. kk.
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was to set up the Jewish nation.
In 19*t7, Britain, facing the disintegration of the empire, referred
the Palestine problem to the United Nations. On November 27, 19^7, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the partition of
Palestine. In May of 19*+8, the Zionist state was born.
Although this general overview has been extremely limited in scope,
it attempted to give an idea of how the Zionist state came into being.
The total role that imperialist powers, particularly the United States,
played would take volumes to explain. In addition, basic factors such
as American Jewish support for and role in the establishment of Israel,
although not highlighted, were extremely important in the making of
Israel. Suffice it to say, that the birth of the Zionist state would
have been aborted had it not been for strong political and economic sup
port from the major capitalist powers.
CHAPTER III
THE ISRAELI AID PROGRAMME: AN OVERVIEW
In his book, Technical Assistance: Theory, Practice and Policies,
Maurice Domergue states that technical assistance (aid) can be defined
as one of the means through which certain countries are trying to get
closer to standards and ways of life prevailing in certain others. If
this is the case in most African countries, the question to ask is
after which country or countries would these nations like to pattern
their development? The Israelis claim that if there is a model that
African nations should follow in their development} it most definitely
should be that of Israel's.
In order to not only gain friends in Africa and spread their own
ideas as well, the Israeli government has built an aid-to-Africa pro
gramme that has broken down some political barriers and made the Israelis
possibly the most welcomed strangers in Africa. Proclaiming her poli
tical neutrality and her relative small size, Israel found herself in
the early 1960's as a useful force in Africa. In fact one African
leader is reported to have told an Israeli official, "you can barely
manage to dominate yourself."2 It is, therefore, under the guise of
]The New York Times, October 16, 1970.
2
Cited in Kreinin, p. 3«
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complete political neutrality and non-alignment that Israel has managed
to court black Africa. Offering, as it does, a different experience from
western colonialism, Israel has placed itself along side African nations
which are struggling against imperialism. This, in and of itself is
paradoxical; because it has already been shown that Israel was established
and held up by western imperialism. Consequently, Israel owes its allegi
ance to the West in general and to the United States in particular. Thus
any actions taken by Israel to "help" the developing nations of Africa
should be interpreted as an attempt to sway those nations toward the
West. Therefore, the propaganda campaign that Israel is carrying on
in Africa should, and to a large degree has been exposed for what it
truly is; a new form of Western infiltration. Given the framework, articles
written in Jewish journals which proclaim that Israel's policy toward Black
Africa should perhaps be seen in wider terms, and should be recognized to
be not just part of its defense line against the Arab world; but also of
a genuine desire to be of help; should be scrutinized carefully.
Needless to say, the Israelis have not restricted this type of analy
sis to Jewish journals. Consequently, one reads in western periodicals
statements suggesting that the underdeveloped countries know that there
is no danger of being swamped by Israel which carries neither the stigma
of the colonialist powers nor the tentacles of the Soviet Union. There
are those Zionist writers who admit the ties between Israeli aid and
The Jerusalem Post Weekly, August 17, 1962. Cited in Kreinin, p. 7.
"Search For Friends," The Economist, Vol. 191, May 16, 1959, p. 8.
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Western imperialism. For example, Harvard Professor Nadav Safran notes
that:
If there is any realistic motive in Israel's programme of
foreign aid, it is probably to be found in the hope that
it will draw tangible rewards from the United States by
serving. . . the same objects that that country seeks to pro
mote through its aid programme.5
Another aim of Israeli aid is to broaden its interests in Africa.
Sanford Silverburg comments:
Israeli foreign policy does enunciate a political purpose,
namely that its aid and assistance—economic or military—
is ultimately to serve its national interests. Israel is
clearly attempting to broaden its presence as much as pos
sible in every way that it is capable when it tenders mili
tary assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.0
The Financial Burden
In the beginning, the United States, Britain and other Western
monopolies eyed Tel Aviv's flirtation with the developing countries with
disapproval, regarding it as another rival. However, these powers soon
became convinced that the Israeli government and its aid programme to
Africa was a Godsend. Western states, particularly the United States,
saw that by financing Israel's foreign aid programmes and using these as
a cover, they could lay the blueprint for their own aggression and expan
sion in Africa. Simultaneously, the neo-colonialists began to lavish
praise upon "tiny" Israel's effective and disinterested aid.
Nadav Safran The United States and Israel (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963). p. 267.
Sanford Silverburg, "Israeli Military and Para Military Assistance
to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Harbinger for the Role of the Military in
Developing States." Master's thesis, American University, 1968, p. 8.
Y. Kaskin, "Israeli Designs in Africa," International Affairs
(Moscow), (February, 1972), 62.
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Back in 1959» Arnold Rivkin gave the first ideological substanti
ation of the decision to use Israel for U. S. purposes. He concluded in
his work,on Africa and the West, that the Israeli type moderate socialism
could become an important model for nations coming out against western
domination and that the Israeli model could prove to be a sort of eco
nomic third force in Africa.
In 1964-1967, Israel received $41.6 million out of the total U.S.A.'s
official military aid of $127 million for its military operations at home
and abroad. In addition, the millions of dollars that the U. S. pours
into Israel to sponsor its aid programme helps to secure the Israeli
economy and stabilize the Zionist regime in the Middle East.
Although, a large amount of the U. S. aid is given to Israel for its
overseas projects; only 0.05 percent of Israel's total foreign aid is
used in Africa. Conversely, the Israelis have built an aid programme
with Africa which has allowed the doors to be flung open to capitalist
businessmen and to uphold pro-Western governments and to destroy pro
gressive governments in Africa.
Framework of Programme
Israel has engaged in a programme of technical assistance with
developing nations on a significant scale since 1961. Table 1 shows the
listings of countries that have signed technical agreements with Israel
and the year that these agreements were signed.
o
The late Rivkin is author of Africa and the West and former director
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On a larger scale, the majority of Israeli experts have been con
centrated on the Continent of Africa. Between 1958-71; the number of
Israeli experts serving in Africa was almost triple that of those ser
ving in Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean area. The Israelis
also have allowed more African students, personnel and trainees to enter
their country than from other parts of the Third World.
Table 2 shows the number of total experts abroad in the year 1970.
For this year alone, Israel was sending more experts to African nations
than any other parts of the Third World.
The Israeli programme of assistance to Africa assumes several basic
forms:
(1) Highly trained Israeli experts are placed at the disposal
of African states, often in strategically important positions.
(2) Various categories of African personnel, including students,
and servants, labor leaders and military cadre are given
specialized training in Israel itself. This training is
usually provided quickly and efficiently.
(3) Israeli businessmen and their government have set up joint
economic enterprises with African states and private busi
ness.9
On a larger scale, Israel aids in the technical fields of agriculture,
regional and urban planning, youth training, vocational training, trade
unionism and a host of other technical and para-military fields.
Of these areas, the youth training, referred to as Gadna (youth
battalions) and Nachal (fighting pioneer youth) are extremely interesting.
Theoretically, these programs are not political; in practice they create
politically potent and military useful bodies. Here is what they do:
Gadna, for boys and girls aged l*f to 18, offers sports, hiking, camping,































































































































































































































crafts, group discussions and cultural activities, as well as physical
work and some pre-mi1itary training. Nachai, which takes up where Gadna
leaves off, is for young men and women of military age and includes
paratroop or regular military training, followed by agricultural settle
ment in difficult or dangerous places.
The Israelis have also sought to impose their pseudo-socialist
Kibbutz and Moshav farm systems on black Africa as a general alterna
tion. Israel's agricultural programmes are arranged around and usually
organized by the military. Before he became Defense Minister, Mosha
Dayan was Minister of Agriculture. The entire Kibbutz and Moshav system
reflect the militarization of agriculture in Israel.
It is exactly these type co-operatives that the Israeli government
exports to Africa. This position is also supported by Western writers.
Peter Worsely serves as an excellent example of how the majority of
Western writers portray Israel. On the subject of agriculture, Worsley
contends:
African independent peasants working on their own patches
within the context of traditional community culture thus
find the Israeli Moshav a more relevant model than more
strictly collectivist forms of organization such as the
Soviet Kolkoz or the Cuban state farms.
Israel insures the tight control that she has over her aid programme
by keeping in close touch with those nations which she has technical and
military ties. The graduates of Israel's training courses are bound
12
together into an international association which is headed by Israelis.
10Ibid., p. 5.
Peter Worsley, The Third World; Found in Africa Research Group,
"David and Goliath. . . .", p. 6.
12
Ironically, the name of this organization is "Shalom" which in
Hebrew means peace.
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The members of this organization keep in close touch with each other
by various reunions, conferences and celebrations. Through such meetings
the entire scope of Israeli life is again pressed upon these trainees and
graduates. In order to create and maintain a favorable image, the Israeli
technical experts carry with them a pro-Israeli government line.
Technical Aid
In most works about Israeli aid programmes to Africa by Zionist
scholars, Israeli aid is usually referred to as "technical co-operation."
According to Domergue, there should be a distinction here between the
terms "technical assistance" and "technical co-operation". Domergue
indicates that technical assistance means one person gives and the other
receives. The first know (or knows how to do) something which the other
does not. On the other hand, technical co-operation implies that both
parties start on the same footing each of them shares their know how with
the other.13 It could be suggested that the Zionists use the term co
operation instead of aid or assistance because of the attraction that
goes along with the word.
It is clear, for instance, that a nation which "gives" techni
cal assistance to another country may well have some avowed
or concealed interests in the deal as one of its goals. The
goal may be political or cultural influence, strategic or
diplomatic considerations, long-term commercial aims, and so
forth. T+
The above evidence supports the conclusion that Israel's programme
in Africa is more of a technical assistance programme than one of tech
nical co-operation. In the words of an Israeli official:
13Maurice Domergue, T»rhnical Assistance: Theory, Practice and
Policies (New York: Praeger, 1973)» P- 15.
i£fIbid., p. 17.
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In our relations with other countries we always found our
selves asking for something: loans from the industrial nations,
military assistance from France a mutual security pact and
friendship treaties with Western countries and release of Jews
from Russia. We have not yet been asked to give anything in
return. True, we once gave the Bible to the world—but this
was a long time ago with Africa we have an opportunity to
restore some balance to our international relations.
Historically, we can trace the first instance of a "purely" Israeli
programme of technical assistance back to the mid-fifties, when political
contacts with Burma were being strengthened. Several teams of experts
were dispatched to that country and Burmese servicemen were received in
Israel for training in agricultural pioneering methods. Contacts multi
plied and the Israeli technical assistance programme was born.
From the very beginning, the co-ordinating agency for Israel's tech
nical aid programme was the International Cooperation Division of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. Since 1958, this division has
set up aid programmes with more than 80 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin
America. As of 1971, nearly 4,000 Israeli advisors had served in develop
ing countries in assignments linked with training of local personnel, and
nearly 15,000 men and women from developing countries have acquired in
Israel skills and know-how to be taken back to their country.
Conversely, it is not surprising that since Israel's designs on
Africa seem to aid in the continuation of neo-colonial and repressive
regimes which are focused on one or another imperialist power; the Israelis
focus a substantial amount of their aid on racial oppressive regimes in
Africa. Thus, of the 38 countries in Africa receiving aid, Israel has
included the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and the South
^Kreinin, pp. 11-12.
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African controlled South West Africa. Moreover, Israel gives assistance
to the racist government of Rhodesia and has extremely extensive aid
programmes with Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana? nations which
are independent but are controlled economically by the Republic of South
Africa.
Between 1951 and 1962, Israel received $15 million in aid and assis
tance from the United States. The Africa Research Group noted that the
transfer of funds to Israel from the United States was done to set up
networks of communication between Israel and the developing world. The
thrust of this aid programme being: U. S. expertise was imported into
other countries. It is interesting to note that the Israelis did not
footnote the American aid programme per se; but modified it with a dis-
tinctiveness based on Israeli experience.
While on the one hand, the United States openly declares that aid is
an instrument of U. S. Foreign policy, on the other, she proclaims that
this aid is meant to bring about a feeling of "self help" toward the
recipient country. Hence, while the Israelis claim that their aid is
non-political; the purpose of U. S. aid is not as forthright.
The purpose of U. S. foreign aid is to promote development.
But development, is not an end in itself: it is a means
to the establishment and maintenance of free democratic
peaceful societies. Political security and economic stabil
ity are seen as the results of development aid.1'
But unlike the United States, Israel never established self con
tained assistance missions abroad. Nor did Israel set up commissaries or
acquire bloc houses for Israelis. The main thrust of the Israeli aid
structure was to work alongside the nations of the other countries and
to live on the sites of projects.
17Paul Stretsen, Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970's
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 27.
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Yet, Israel has not denied that some of the basic reasons for her
aid to Africa is to foster her own self interests, such as the obvious
advantages of gaining friends in the African world. In addition, Israel
seeks to pave the way for an expansion of export markets for her products.
Further, the Israelis realize that technical aid with other nations can
provide employment for a small but significant Israeli manpower surplus.
Although Israel's technical assistance programme was the most exten
sive one in the world (on a per capita basis) its overall drain upon
Israel's manpower is proportionally small. This is particularly due to
the African cadres undergoing training in Israel. Moreover, Israel's
technical assistance programme utilizes many technicians, professionals,
18
and doctors who normally would have been functionally unemployed at home.
Consequently, the Israeli government has allowed Jewish entrepreneurs to
invest in Africa on a much higher scale than in other developing areas.
Once the gates to African nations are opened by setting up aid programmes,
then the framework is set for Zionist businessmen to come in and exploit
the riches of Africa.
Emphasizing that after 1966, Israeli aid began to decrease in favor
of Israeli trade. Stuart Schaar has cited another reason for Israeli
interest in Africa:
After ten years of African experience, Israel has begun to
re-think both the philosophy and aims of her trade ventures
below the Sahara. Initially, Israelis have argued, assistance
to Africa began as a relatively disinterested activity. . .
whatever underlying motives may have been over a decade ago
in founding networks of international co-operation, it quickly
became clear that the key to Israel's relations with Africa
was the desire to woo as many states as possible away from the




Egyptian orbit of influence. (However recently) the potential
of African markets for absorbing surplus farm commodities
and manufactured products attracted Jewish entrepreneurs to
the sprawling continent as soon as they had goods to sell
abroad* and accordingly, exports to Africa increased from 2
million in 1956 to Zk.k million in 1967 represents only k per
cent of Israel's total exports, it is still 20 per cent higher
than the corresponding figure for 1966 ($19.5 million). These
statistics, when matched against others relating to African
technical assistance, provide some indication of the greater
emphasis which Israel has lately been placing on trade rather
than aid in AfricaJ9
Technical assistance is not the only aid programme which Israel
exports to African nations. As early as 1962, Israel was involved in one
of the most extensive aid programmes ever to be dispensed to African
nations: military assistance.
Military Assistance
Of all the areas in which Israel has advised, sent trainees and in
vested money with developing nations; perhaps the most notorious is its
military assistance programme. In Africa alone, between I960 and 1966
Israel had set up military aid programmes with nearly every black African
nation. Here is a brief example of what Israel did as regards military
aid to Africa. In 1963; 243 Congolese paratroopers were sent to Israel
for air training? this list included President, General Joseph Mobutu.
In I960 Israel organized the Ghana Air Force and helped to implement its
flying school. In 1963, 15 Ugandan army officers were trained in Israel
and by 1964 Israel had trained the entire Uganda Air Force.
Table 3 gives a listing of African nations and the nature of the
military training dispensed to them by Israel. According to Silverburg,
19Stuart H. Schaar, "Patterns of Israeli Aid and Trade in East
Africa," American Universities Field Staff Reports: East Africa Series,
(May, 1972), Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-2.
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Israel's motives for tendering military aid to Africa are grounded in
that nation's long range political goals. Silverburg explains:
Israeli objectives are by far, long range political goals
that by their very nature have had effects on the internal
development of institutions within several sub-Saharan states.
In this instance the institution is the military establishment.
A third contributing factor to the complexity of Israeli moti
vation in Africa is the priority by which aid is given to meet
state's ends. Israeli military assistance to Ethiopia, is, in
part due to the latter's contiguity to the Red Sea and the Bab
al-Mandab. This, therefore, is an attempt to protect its ship
ping lanes to the Afro-Asian commercial world and from there to
Israel. While this is the case in Ethiopia it is a political
motive in the Congo(K). This political priority is manifested
in the training of paratroops. This training is intended to
(1) maintain the viability of the state which will in turn pro
vide (2) a political ally in Africa.20
TABLE 3
ISRAELI MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1960-66









Israeli Army officers set up Nahal-
Gadna system in January.
50 study grants to individuals.
]k Army officers set up National
Pioneer Youth with Israel-trained
staff (2-year contract).
Student training by advisers sent to
youth movement.
2 Israeli advisers killed in counter-
insurgency operations with Chad Army
against National Liberation Front
of Chad.
20
Silverburg, Op,, cit., pp. 8-9.
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TABLE 3—Continued





1963 2**3 Congolese paratroops sent to
Israel for air training, including
now President, General Joseph
Mobutu.
1964 Israeli advisers go to Congo to pro
vide 100 more Congolese troops
with parachute instruction, in
October.
1968 In March, Israelis train 35 more
paratroopers win First Paracom-
mando Battalion, considered "best
unit".
1962 Israelis "advise" First Army Pioneer
Company
I966 2 Israeli advisers administer Young
Pioneers Youth Movement (USAID
supported)
1960-66 Israelis operate counterinsurgency
program directed against Eritrean
Liberation Front and Shiftas of
Kenya.
Israelis replace US Special Forces
"removed" after aborted coup by
US-trained Ethiopian officers.
Substantial cooperation between
Ethiopian and Israeli military
operations includes: training for
special forces, intelligence,
counterinsurgency operations.
Israel maintains major military mis
sion graduating 500 men every 6
months.
Israel cooperates with US and Ethi
opian military in establishing base
at Jebel Hamid.
















Israel provides assistance to Army,
Navy units.
British commercial interests force
Israel out of Ghana
Nahal-Gadna type program set up with
help from USAID.
Service civique revamped and revita
lized, to consternation of French.
Army school for "civic action" estab
lished.
On advice of Israel, Ivory Coast seeks
to use Army in "national service".
Israel equips Presidential Guard with
Israeli-made Uzzi 7:66mm submachine
guns.
5 Air Force cadets and 30 Army per
sonnel "unofficially" trained through
1963 (negligible program).
Israel trains medical personnel, k
instructors help set up Malawi
Young Pioneers Movement, para
military organization of 500 to 700
members.
Army and police training provided.
Israeli-made 11 mm mortars supplied.
1967 charge that Israel also supplies
weapons to Biafra denied by Israeli
ambassador to Nigeria in January
1969.
Israel helps set up Military Academy;
65 officers remain for 2 additional
years.
50 cadets trained in 193-day course.
National Service Corps set up on Israeli
model with Israeli assistance runs in
to trouble when 117 members are de
trained or discharged for disloyalty
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TABLE ^--Continued
Country Year Nature of Israeli Program
(no implication of Israeli involve
ment).
1964 24 Naval Marine cadets trained.
1966 120 police receive paratroop train
ing; unit assigned to maintain
order, deter cattle rustling and,
according to speculations, reserved
for use against Zanzibar if neces
sary.
Israel rumored to be involved with
Tanzanian intelligence.
TogO 1961 7-man Israeli team organizes Agricul
tural Youth Corps using Gadna tech
niques.
Experiments with moshav settlement
schemes initiated.
Uganda I963 15 Army officers, 5 pilots trained in
Israel.
1964 Air force organized and trained.
1966 Israel assumes all military training,
supplies some planes, is alleged to
be conduit for French assistance
to Uganda.
Source: Africa Research Group, "David and Goliath Collaborate in
Africa," pp. 9-13-
As far as capabilities are concerned, the Israeli military programme
is extremely flexible and independent. According to Silverburg, although
strict military assistance conducted on the part of the Israeli Ministry
of Defense with the possible coordination of the other ministries, the
military need not seek approval from the Knesset for its aid programmes
as long as it has allocated funds for its overseas activities. The allo-
cation of funds for such programmes has not been a tremendous problem
to the Israelis in as much as the United States finances the bulk of the
Israeli aid programme.
Politically, the Israelis do more than just "train" army personnel
in African states. The entire programme is a conscious effort to align
African nations with the West. For example, in the case of Ethiopia,
the Israelis operated counterinsurgency programmes which were directed
against the Eritrean Liberation Front. Afraid that this nationalist
movement would undermine his pro-West leadership in that nation, Emperor
Halie Selassie asked for and received military aid from Israel. The
Eritrean Front had always been an unpopular movement with the United
States and it was the aim and ambition of the United States government
to keep Emperor Selassie in power; although his rule has continued to
be at best, autocratic and dictatorial.
Another instance of Israeli aggression in Africa is its support of
the separatist Biafran in Nigeria.
Up to July 1969, Israel had sent 250,000 of official aid
for Biafran relief and dispatched several medical teams.
Foreign Minister Abba Eban, speaking in the Israeli Parlia
ment, stated on July 9 that the Israeli government had "the
duty" to send maximum aid to Biafra. A broadcast on Radio
Kaduna (Northern Nigeria) later that month accused Israel of
sending tanks, artillery and rockets to Biafra in the guise
of relief supplies and of training Biafrans in guerrilla war
fare techniques.2^
Consequently, Israel's military assistance does have a political
function. It seeks to continue repressive regimes in Africa and to foster
a Western oriented ideology on the military in Africa.
21"Israel and Biafra: A Comparison," Midstream, January, 1970.
Cited in Hyman Lumer, Zionism: Its Role in World Politics (New York:
International Publishers, 1973)* P» *tf.
CHAPTER IV
GHANA AND ISRAEL: 1957-1964
Since its birth, Israel has sought to have close ties with African
nations. The mere fact that Liberia voted for the partition of Palestine,
was in and of itself a blessing for the Israelis. During the early fif
ties there was an honorary Israeli consulate set up in Monrovia, although
diplomatic missions between these two countries were not exchanged until
1957.]
However, it was the effect of Israel's co-operation and ties with
Ghana that were to radiate all over the African continent. Therefore,
after gaining its independence in March of 1957, Ghana was to be faced
with a new force in Africa. Masquerading under the guise of mutual co
operation and neutrality, Israel was to become an important factor in
Ghanaian politics. Ghana, for its part, was to shake the foundations of
the African continent by instituting a long range trade and aid programme
with Israel. Need we hasten to add, the very nature of this relationship
would lean heavily toward new found advances for Israel in Africa; while
it would also serve to undermine the general goal of African Nationalism,
the eradication and dismissal of western economic and political power on
the continent.
Liberia delighted Israeli diplomats by transferring its «?*>■«*
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May of 1969. A move which even the United
States and Great Britain refused to make because there is no international
agreement on the status of the Holy City.
March 6, 1957 was independence day for Ghana. Fifty-six nations
sent delegations. The United States was represented by Richard Nixon,
Britain by R. A. Butler, Russia by its Minister of Farms and Tunisia by
Bourguiba himself. Israel sent Ehud Avriel, the man who was later to be
a most important person in Ghana's domestic and foreign policy.
From the vantage point of the West, Ghana at first appeared safe.
That is, the United States and Great Britain had viewed the transformation
from colonialism to independence in Ghana as the "correct" procedure or
model for other nations to follow. The Americans along with the British
presented their credentials to the new nation first. They were soon fol
lowed by the representatives from Australia, France and West Germany. Yet,
from the beginning, the Israeli ambassador had established himself as the
most influential, diplomat in Accra.
In order to understand the very strong ties which Israel had with
Ghana, it is extremely important to note the political philosophy and per
sonality of Ghana's first President.
Kwame Nkrumah
During the early stages of Ghana's fight with British colonialism,
the outspoken leader of the African position was Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah
organized the Convention People's Party in June 19<+9 and through this
organization he fought for the freedom of Ghana from colonial rule.
When Ghana became independent within the Commonwealth of Nations in
1957, Nkrumah became bent on curtailing foreign domination in the newly
independent country. He therefore sought aid and assistance from both
Western and Eastern nations as he proclaimed the political neutrality of
Ghana.
Internationally, Nkrumah was thought of as the leader of African
independence and nationalism. In those very early days of Africa's
struggle against colonialism, Nkrumah was a raging voice in support of
strong African unity against the colonial oppressors. In his book, Africa
Must Unite, Nkrumah stated:
A point in our history has been reached where Africa's interests
must be the prime concern of Africa's leaders. The safety and
progress of everyone of our states can be safeguarded only by
the acceptance of the precept; which can best be promoted by
unalloyed unity. This means that where associations linking
African countries with European powers cut across basic African
interests at any level and offer impediments to the goal of
union, they must be discarded and rejected where they are
offered. In all relations with the world overseas, the key
consideration must be not merely the superficial or even
intrinsic advantage of such relationships for the given country
but the obligation to the African continent as a whole.2
Even though Africa Must Unite, was published after the demise of
Nkrumah, his earlier writings foretold his genuine and sincere belief in
African freedom and dignity. While more moderate leaders in Ghana were
calling for eventual independence, Nkrumah urged the Ghanaians to seek
"self government now". His staunch position on this matter and popular
support from the African population raised him to an even higher level in
the struggle for African determination, solidarity and independence.
In his work, I Speak of Freedom, Nkrumah spoke the words that would
make Ghana the very first Black African nation to break the chains of col
onial rule and direct foreign oppression. Asserting the basic need for
independence, Nkrumah notes that there comes a time in the history of
colonial peoples when they must because of their will to throw off the
hampering shackles of colonialism, boldly assert their God-given right to
2Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: International Publish
ers, 1970), p. 185.
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be free of foreign rule.
In light of what has been written about Nkrumah's general ideology,
it seems almost paradoxical that the Israelis would have gained such a
large foothold in Ghana during his Presidency. Zionists assert that the
close ties between Israel and Ghana were sown because of Nkrumah's wish
to counter potential Egyptian influence in Black Africa.
Another reason for Nkrumah's general attitude towards Israel was his
basic educational background and political outlook. He had gone to school
in the United States and Great Britain. He took pride in these factors
and in the general principles of Western democracy and free speech. In
his address to the House of Commons and Senate in Ottawa in July of 1957
Nkrumah proclaimed:
We in Ghana have a strong feeling of pride in our Commonwealth. . .
On obtaining our independence, we choose to become a member of the
Commonwealth of our own free will. We enjoy the same institutions
of parliamentary democracy and the same climate of politics and
public morality as the other members; we have the same respect
for tradition and the same regard for ceremonial; we place the
same value on the human individual and appreciate the dignity of
restraint; we accept the sovereignty of Law and the sanctity of
the pledged word.5
Therefore, Nkrumah's overall respect and admiration for Western institu
tions and parliamentary procedure should not be underestimated vis-a-vis
his general attitude toward foreign policy goals for Ghana.
Taking his admiration for western institutions a bit further, Nkrumah
delighted American newsmen at a United States press conference in 1957.
3Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1961), pp. 30-31.
See for example, Arnold Rivkin "Israel and the Afro-Asian World,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 3 (April, 1959), 486-87.
^Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, p. 136.
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On the general question of racism in the United States, Nkrumah remarked
that wherever racism existed it should be abolished. However, he has
tened to add: "It seems, however, that the racial question in the United
States had often been exaggerated deliberately by those who hope to
bring the country into disrepute". All this, from a man who had spent
years in America and who had himself experienced the hideous nature of
American racism. On the question of a communist element in Ghana, he
replied: "So far as I know, I don't think there is any communist element
or group as such . . . . We in Ghana have no fear. I might even go fur
ther and say that our better institutions. . . do not allow the ideology
to have a fruitful set-up in our country." And finally, on the matter of
his close ties with Israel and possible objections from African states,
Nkrumah said: "There is not, and there can never be any objections from
any other African government. . ., I remember when I was in Cairo I was
never even asked the question."
More importantly, Nkrumah's ties with Israel were to allow the Israeli
aid programme to spread over the African continent. Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania, Hasting Banda of Malawi, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia along
with a host of other African leaders raced to set up diplomatic ties with
the Zionist state. Through Nkrumah, Israel achieved a great diplomatic
coup throughout Africa.
In summary, Nkrumah's attitude toward Israel was far from negative.
Of course, he considered the country as an imperialist enclave; but cer
tainly not an illegally established one like Rhodesia. He admired what
the Israelis had accomplished. "Remember too that in those years his first
6Ibid., pp. 139-^0.
priority was to develop Ghana, and he thought we could do much to help
him",7 an Israeli diplomat noted.
Aid and Trade
Early in 1957, the Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry went
to Ghana to represent Israel at the independence day ceremony. Formal
trade relations between the countries were cemented shortly thereafter.
The initial contact, however, between these two nations took place in
1956 when the Israeli representative to the 1956 inauguration of the
Liberian President met Ghana's Minister of Labor (Mr. Botsio), the latter
asked that an Israeli consulate be set up in Accra. The very first
Israeli in a Black African country was to be H. Yavorj he was later fol
lowed by Ehud Avriel, who was to play a dynamic role in the establish
ment of trade and aid agreements between the two countries.
The first shipment of Israeli goods to Ghana consisted of 1,000 tons
of cement and miscellaneous industrial items. In 1958 a long term trade
agreement between Israel and Ghana was made. The principal feature of
this agreement was the provision of credits to Ghana in the sum of $20
million over a four year period. All credits involved in a two year
grace period for payments of principal. Under the agreement, Ghana
bought cement and other building material and equipment, tires, glass,
ceramics, paper, cardboards, leather goods, plastics and other industrial
goods. In return, Ghana exported to Israel, cocoa, coffee, copra, oil
Q
seeds, hides, bauxite and diamonds.
Although the terms of this agreement appeared favorable to Ghana,
^Thompson, Op., cvt., p. kl,
"Israel and the Afro-Asian World," p. 489.
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in actuality, this agreement and similar ones like it which were enacted
all over Africa, were extremely beneficial to the Israeli government.
Samuel Decalo explains that African imports of a number of Israeli com
modities (e.g., furniture, cement, distilled soya oiD, even if small in
absolute figures amount to over 50 percent of total Israeli exports of
these items. He also adds that there are a number of other commodities
(e.g., asbestos, pipes, Pharmaceuticals, carpets) of which Africa pur
chases 25 percent of the Israeli exports with significant purchases of
q
others below the figure.
A company was formed in 1957 by Israel and Ghana to coordinate
trade between Israel and West Africa. As the headquarters for Dizengoff
West Africa Ltd., Accra became the center of trade between Israel and all
of West Africa. The purpose of this company was to allow Israeli business
firms to trade with West African nations without the use of Western busi
ness firms in the transactions. With a branch office in Tel Aviv, the
Israelis soon opened another branch of the company in Lagos, Nigeria in
the early months of 1958. It is not surprising that the company received
orders for over 550,000 dollars worth of Israeli goods; while Ghana and
the rest of West Africa exported only half that amount.
By far, the most ambitious undertaking between Israel and Ghana was
the Black Star Shipping Line which was incorporated in Ghana in the fall
of 1957. In the beginning, Ghana owned 60 percent of the corporation with
Israel receiving the remaining kO percent. However, within a five year
period Ghana had the option to buy out the remaining kO percent from the
Israel is.
9Decalo, "Israel and Africa; A Selected Bibliography," p. 391.
A strange situation occurred after the dedication of the Black Star
Line in Ghana. Nkrumah, either from sheer caution or because of strong
resentment that was building up against him in Egypt, did not thank the
Israelis for the project. Although he did express gratitude the next day
in Parliament after Avriel had pointed out his omission.
The 40 percent that Israel owned in the Black Star Line belonged to
Zim (the Israeli Navigation Company), which was a private Israeli corpor
ation. Needless to say, Zim was the managing agent and opted to opera
ting the Black Star Line for five years. According to Israeli sources,
Nkrumah asked them to manage the Line for twenty-five years. (While Israel
appearing not to be ambitious) openly compromised for five. According
to Silverburg, this was an indication that:
Israel is setting out to demonstrate in West Africa how she
can launch a foreign assistance programme on a shoestring. . .
The effort is plainly intended to build friendship with the
independent African countries as a counter-force to the in- ^
fluence of the Arab bloc, as well as to develop trade relations.
After the shipping line was formed, Israel then followed up with an
offer to Ghana to train 30 of its citizens to become ship officers at the
Israeli Maritime School at Accra.
Another venture the Israelis undertook in Ghana was investment in
the building industry. As in the case of the Black Star Line, Israel owned
kO percent, which was controlled by Solel Boneh. The Ghanaians received
10It is even stranger to cite the fact that in spite of the numerous
invitations bestowed upon him by Zionists, Nkrumah never visited Israel.
Conversely, he visited Cairo on several occasions and even expressed
solidarity with Egypt on the Middle East conflict. Although he did not
brand Israel as an imperialist aggressor until the early 'bO's.
11 Silverburg, Op., cvt., p. kl.
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60 percent of the industry. The industrial complex of Israel's General
Federation of Trade Union (Histadrut) and Solel Boneh, trained Ghanaians
in the techniques of the construction industry.
During this period, Ghana moved to change its trade union movement so
that it could be closely aligned to that of Israel's. At the end of the
1950's the leaders of Ghana's government had come to believe that their
trade union structure was "different in structure and in aims from the
labor movement in Western industrial countries, similar to the Histadrut
12
in aims but in structure a Ghanaian movement as such." This movement
and the total role that Israel played in Ghana remained strong up until
1963, the year that Nkrumah began to alter his policies toward Israel.
In October of I960, the Histadrut organized the Afro-Asian Institute
for Labor Studies and Cooperation in Tel Aviv. This organization was
headed by Ellahu Elath, Israel's first Ambassador to the United States.
Financed by a grant through the AFL-CIO, the Institute was organized and
funded at the cost of $60,000. Between 1960-62 alone, it received over
$300,000 in scholarships and grants from the American organization. The
Africa Research Group points out that African trade unions are highly poli
tical instruments and that the training which takes place in Israel seeks
to depolitize them by pushing a cooperative orientation rather than a
working class revolutionary one.
Military Assistance
The Israelis were instrumental in the organization and formation of
12Ghana's TUC. The New Charter for Ghana's Labor (Accra). Quoted
in Kreinin, p. 123.
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the Ghana Air Force. Claiming that their mission was to provide train-
Ing and Instruction In the various types of aircrafts, the Israelis sought
to counter any other foreign military training in Ghana. To be precise,
the formal and actual mission of setting up an air force was initially
given to India. However, the Israelis, acting under the control of Avriel,
raced to become the military trainers in this West African nation.
But due to the insistence of Nkrumah that the complicated affairs
could bring on internal problems, the Israelis along with the Indians
were advised to leave Ghana and hand the training of the air force over
to the British. General Henry J. Alexander, Nkrumah's former chief of
staff explains the situation this way:
During 1959, two Indian Air Force officers had arrived to
start planning the formation of the Ghana Air Force, and it
was intended that the Indians should train it. Unfortunately,
for reasons best known to the Ghana government, the establish
ment of a flying school was entrusted to the Israelis. This
Israeli training team took the form of a mission responsible
to the Israeli ambassador and not under effective command of
the Indians. . .As very little progress had been made with the
actual ordering of air craft and the formation of the Air Force
as such, I decided that the whole problem needed to be assessed.
The first principle which I established with Nkrumah was that
one country and one country only should be responsible for
training. To my mind, it could have been either the Indians
or the Israelis complete. Nkrumah would not accept a solution
of this kind, since he did not wish to offend one country
whilst appearing to favour the other. I therefore, suggested
that he ask the British to take on the air force (and) ask both
the Israelis and the Indians to step d'J
The result of the decision brought on sharp criticism by the Israelis.
For their part, the Israelis insisted that British commercial interests
were involved. Rationalizing that because Israel was using French planes,
13yfiaior General/ H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: My Tw<
crumah's Chief of Staff (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp.
52
the Zionists insisted that this was a decision by the British to curtail
French control in Ghana. "It was believed that the British were concerned
lest Israeli training might result in a decision by Ghana to bring in
French instead of British jet aircraft."^ To be sure, the Israelis were
not as concerned about the British commercial interests as they were about
losing their strong political position in Ghana.
In I960, Ghana requested the Israeli Defense Ministry to furnish
officer instructors to help the new Ghanaian Army. Five Israeli officers
were sent to serve as instructors for Ghana's infantry officers and four
were sent to the Ghana Builders Brigade (an organization similar to the
Israeli Nachal). Two senior Israeli officers, Lieutenant Colonel Y.
Bin-Dor and Lieutenant Colonel Y. Dvier were chosen by Nkrumah to help
with the Navy. Bin-Dor headed the Nautical School, while Dvier commanded
Nkrumah's personal yacht. The chief engineer of the yacht was also an
Israeli.
In the final analysis, however, Israel's achievements in Ghana was
the result of one man's diplomacy. In Nkrumah's nine years, only two
ambassadors were outstanding favorites on the diplomatic scene in Accra,
and had considerable influence over him. One of them was George Rodionov
(between 1962-66), the Russian ambassador to Ghana; the other was Ehud
Avriel (between 1957-1960), of Israel.
As Ambassador to Ghana, Avriel filled the role of confidant to
Nkrumah. In fact, Avriel, was the man who introduced Nkrumah to Lumumba.
But, according to Scott Thompson, in diplomatic circles this
was considered less remarkable than that at times it was Avriel
Silverburg, 0£. cvt., p. 63.
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who had to intercede to arrange an appointment for the American
Ambassador with Nkrumah. When Nkrumah wished to write a book,
it was Avriel who produced the Ghost, who in turn quickly pro
duced a serviceable manuscript. True, Avriel was the bene
ficiary of weak American and British diplomacy, but his compe
tence and foresight stand out no less for this.15
For over a year, Avriel had a clear field but, apparently sensing
that at some point Nkrumah1s pan-African ambitions and Israel's diploma
tic aims would collide, he was skeptical of the relationship from the
start. Unlike the Americans and the British, he made the most of his
opportunity, obtaining the substance of what Israel wanted—its entry into
Africa. As early as 1959, he began scaling the conspicuous activity
down so as to make their long-range position more tenable. When Nkrumah's
ideas for the Black Star Line became extravagant by Israelis standards,
the Israelis opted out, before Egyptian pressure might have driven them
out. After all, the ships were blacklisted from Suez and it was a deli
cate situation which neither Egypt's Nasser nor Nkrumah wished to put to
the test.
In the meantime, relations with Egypt had grown a pace. Nkrumah's
two fold policy would indeed have to change if he were to appear as a
friend to the Egyptians. After all, Egypt was in Africa and strong
Ghanaian-Israeli relations would only foster strained relations between
Ghana and Egypt in particular and Ghana and in the Arab world in general.
Egypt and Ghana
At the 1961 Casablanca Conference, where the more moderate African
states were not represented, Egypt's President Nasser made of his sharpest
Thompson, p.
attacks on the Israeli role in Africa:
Israel is at present granting aid in Africa, even though we
know that Israel is not in a position to balance her budget
from her resources. That is because this country is acting
as a go-between between the colonial powers and the countries
of Africa passing on aid to them. Israel is the wolf which has
gotten into the sheepfold. What was Israel's attitude with
regards to the Cameroons and the Congo? What was her attitude
with regard to the Algerian people? What was her attitude in
regard to nuclear tests in the Sahara?10
The Casablanca Conference was not the first occasion upon which the
United Arab Republic (UAR) sought to ostracize Israel. Indeed, efforts
in this direction were made at the very first African meeting convoked—
the 1958, Accra First Conference of Independent African States. However,
the charges against Israel came to no avail at this conference, largely
due to Nkrumah's unwillingness to brand Israel as a neo-coloniaiist power.
The I960, Second Conference of Independent African States (IAS) (Addis
Ababa) saw another attempt by Nasser to ostracize Israel. This too
was unsuccessful, and many African states refused to even connect them
selves politically with the Arab cause in the Middle East, not to mention
the rights of the Palestinian people.
The year 1961, was however, Nasser's year. On January 7th, a com
munique entitled the Casablanca Communique, was issued. Included in the
communique was a resolution on Palestine in which the signatories (Ghana,
Guinea and Mali), denounced Isreal as an instrument in the service of
imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the Middle East, but also in
Africa and Asia.
Although Israel was first to set up diplomatic ties with Ghana, ties
l6Doudore Theam, The Foreign Policy of African States (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965)» p. 66.
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of friendship between Egypt and Ghana had been sown as early as 1957. The
fact that Nkrumah married an Egyptian Coptic woman in December, 1957 was
one of the most bizarre alliances made of rational foreign policy in
Ghanaian history. In choosing his wife, Nkrumah dispatched a member of
Parliament, William Baidoe-Ansah, an alert and intelligent businessman
off to Egypt to find him a bride. Baidoe-Ansah consulted five Coptic
families and finally made a deal with Mr. Adley Marcos Sadek for the hand
of his niece Fathia Hal em Ritzk, a student at Cairo University. She was
flown to Ghana on December 30th and was married to Nkrumah three hours
later. The Egyptian wife of Nkrumah did not speak one word of English
nor he any Arabic. In spite of the language barrier, Nkrumah and his
wife remained together and that union became a catalyst for stronger
Egyptian-Ghanaian ties.
The Grand Cordon of the Order of the Nile, Egypt's highest decora
tion served as a wedding present to the couple. Ironically, the Ghana
ian government signed a twenty million dollar trade deal with Israel on
the very same day that this decoration was received. Lebannon followed
in due course and sent its highest decoration, the Order of the Cedars.
With the stage thus set, Nkrumah was in a starring role to court Arab
powers.
Dr. M. Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister held Nkrumah in high
esteem. At the IAS Conference he discussed the possibility of military
cooperation between Egypt and Ghana. This included a joint African high
command. Although the proposal went no further for at least two years,
17Russell Warren Howe, "Ghana: The First Year," Phvion, Vol. 19,
No. 3, (1958), p. 285.
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it showed the interests and foresight that both shared toward African
affairs.
In mid-1958 the Egyptian ambassador arrived in Accra. From the
outset one of the driving forces behind the Egyptian policy was to force
the Israelis out. Avriel, was determined, however, on keeping the Israelis
in. It appeared to some that the basic reason for Egypt's presence in
Ghana was to stop the Israelis. The counter argument was that Egypt's
diplomacy dictated that it react to the aggressive nature of Israel in
Ghana. The truth of the matter was that Nasser was anxious to get on
with inter-African affairs. In this he saw both Ghana's Nkrumah and his
overall role in the Arab world as a vital link in the chain of a success
ful policy.
As Nkrumah became closer to Egypt his relationship with Israel be
came strained. Although the technical aid given by Israel had been use
ful; the overall strategy of Avriel had allowed for too much Israeli
autonomy in Ghana. Furthermore, Nkrumah was not at all pleased with the
general attitude taken by the Israelis on the limited role he wanted them
to play in his country. It was as if the Israelis were attempting to set
up their own colony in the heart of Accra. Once Nkrumah realized this,
he switched his policy toward a normalization process with Egypt and the
Arab world. According to Mr. Yarden, Secretary of the Israeli Mission
to the United Nations, Nkrumah had every right to be alarmed by the
Israelis. For Mr. Yarden admits: "Our fellows went on a rampage in
Ghana. Nkrumah woke up one morning to find Israelis all over the place
18
running the country—that is when he decided to normalize things a bit."
18Decalo, Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation, p. 103.
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The pattern was clear, after I960, Nkrumah's attitude toward the
Israeli aid programme in Ghana had become lukewarm. Efforts towards rid
ding Ghana completely of the Israelis were not attempted; however,
Nkrumah sought to align himself closer to the Arab world and this move
altered the Israeli campaign in Africa.
By 1962, Nkrumah's policies toward Israel had gone full circle. Stop
ping short of dismissing the Israelis from Ghana, Nkrumah aimed toward
closer unification of African nations and the exclusion of Israel.
Finally, it can be stated that Israel and Egypt fulfilled different
functions in Nkrumah's strategies. No matter how much Nkrumah's thoughts
evolved, concerning the State of Israel, Ghana had instituted too many ties
with Israel for the relationship to be altered overnight. Nor were the
Israelis prepared to stand by silently as political links weakened.
Israel was somewhat dismayed that by I960, Ghana had replaced its
products with those from Egypt. Madam Fathia Nkrumah was doing her part
by inaugurating a new Egyptian/Ghanaian air service.
While Ghana had been relatively quiet in the United Nations on ques
tions that concerned Israel by 1963, with most of the Israelis removed
from Ghana, Israel began to worry about Ghana's position on the Middle
East. To the Israelis thinking, Nkrumah could venture into the world of
U. N. resolutions and make comments that would further compromise Israel's
ties with Ghana. After the Iraqi crisis in early 1963, Nkrumah could not
resist speaking out on the Middle East. Alarmed over the "grim possi
bility of the re-establishment and strengthening of neo-colonialism in
the Middle East";19 Nkrumah opted for a Palestinian State in the Middle
^Thompson, 0£. cit.. p. 285.
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East. Moreover, he commented that Israel should be kept within the
limits laid down by the United Nations and should not be allowed to
advance its territory in the Middle East.
Throughout the latter part of his rule, Nkrumah played a two-sided
hand in the Middle East. Accepting Israeli aid on the one hand; while
on the other he sought to counter Israeli influence in Africa. Of course,
this divergent policy came after the Israelis had well established them
selves in all of Africa. Yet, it must be understood that Nkrumah's first
priority was the development of Ghana. His failure in this manner was
his shortsightedness on the real nature of Israeli aid and his inability
to stop the Israelis from advancing in all of Africa.
It has been speculated that Nkrumah wished to be an African mediator
for the Middle East conflict. However, his early policies toward Israel
spoke to a pro-Israeli or at best a neutralist position on the question.
Realizing that Israel's interest in Ghana ran farther than setting up
technical assistance programmes, Nkrumah altered his policy toward
Israel's role in the Middle East in general and Israel's position in
Africa in particular.
CHAPTER V
UGANDA AND ISRAEL: 1963-1972
On October 9, 1962, Uganda became an independent nation within the
commonwealth of nations. On one of her goodwill trips to East Africa in
February of 1963, the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir visited Uganda
and set up a technical aid agreement with the new nation.
There were three basic aspects of Israeli technical aid to Uganda.
These consisted of courses in Uganda, courses in Israel, and the provision
of experts from Israel to Uganda.
The Israelis offered one year upgrading courses in agriculture, speci
ally organized for Ugandans in Israel. Twenty-three students went in 1963
and a further 25 in 1965. Uganda contributed only the cost of travel.
This factor was not a rarity for Israel. The Israelis always made it much
easier for the recipient country to send its citizens to Israel rather
than for them to export large numbers of Israelis to the developing nations,
Only rarely have criticisms been voiced in African legislatures to this
lopsided manner of financing the Israeli experts in Africa. As a high
official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs remarked on one occasion:
There have been a few rare criticisms by irresponsible elements
in African nations, spurred by foreign economic and political
interests, but seldom has there been a complaint by an official
]Hal Mettrick, Aid in Uganda: Agriculture (London: Overseas
Development Institute, Ltd., 1967), p. 83.
59
60
organ. The fact remains that though our experts are not
for free the Africans are taxing our resources with their
requests for more and more of them.2
The Ugandan government made it quite clear from the outset that
Israeli aid was desirable in that country* In 1963» the Uganda Minister
of Interior and Defense declared that Israel was the only country to
which Uganda was looking for aid: "We believe that your country has more
to offer us than highly developed countries in the West," he stated.
By 1964, Israel had firmly cemented its technical aid programme with
Uganda. During that year, places had been made available for Ugandans in
agriculture and agricultural engineering at a technical high school in
Israel. Six Ugandan students were chosen to undertake the course. Non-
academic courses were also provided in Israel in poultry, fertilizers,
water irrigation and vegetable production. Up until 1965, over 60 Ugandans
had taken four to six months courses in this area.
Another factor of Israeli aid to Uganda was that the Israeli govern
ment arranged courses in Uganda. As a result, explained the Israelis, of
their receiving immigrants from backward rural communities, they felt par
ticularly qualified in agricultural extension work. Four instructors were
provided to give three courses for 30 people each in 1963 in agriculture
and one course for 60 people in 1965 in animal husbandry.
Experts were provided to advise on cooperatives, poultry and citrus
production. In order to develop its citrus production, Uganda had modeled
its production after Israel. A feasibility survey was first of all made
2Decalo, "Israel and Africa: The Politics of Cooperation," p. 232.
3Ibid.. p. 218.
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by an expert from Israel, and on the basis of his report a citrus grower
was sent to Uganda to establish a pilot project.
The Israelis seemed to feel that contacts at the technical level
would demonstrate the value of normal relations at the political level.
They showed a preference for programmes that could reach fruition fairly
quickly and that require at the outset minimal resources on the benefi-
ciary's part.
Military Aid
Speaking to the very nature of the military in Africa, Ruth First
has commented that despite the great wave from colonial to independent
government, there remained a continuity between the old dependence and the
new. "The armies are colonial products. . . ."5 Indeed, very few will
argue against the fact that the military in Third World nations were
developed for the security and stabilization of European colonialism and
most definitely not for the protection of African societies. In this con
text, Israel rushed to set up a strong military assistance programme in
Uganda.
As early as 1963, (less than one year after independence) 15 Ugandan
army officers and five pilots had been trained in Israel. This move was
the initial step taken by Israel in training the Ugandan army. Again in
1964, Israel offered military assistance to the newly established Ugandan
air force (and police air wing). Israel subsequently sent two IAI Fouga-
Magister jet trainers to the pilot schools at Entebbe and Jinja. After
Laufer, 0^. jcit,., p. 32.
5Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p.
27.
62
that, Uganda received four additional Magisters for a total of six in
their air arm. In 1968, Israeli Air Force officers were training
Ugandan pilots at the Entebbe school.
As in the case of Ghana, Israel took over the job of training the
Ugandan military. By 1965» a number of officers and men equal to one
battalion had been trained in Israel. As a political force, Israel indi
cated a willingness to assist Uganda in its efforts to halt the incur
sions by Sudanese rebels, but the Ugandans repeatedly declined.
Israeli military and technical assistance was originally invited
into Uganda under the leadership of Uganda's first President, Milton
Obote.
Milton Obote
On February 22, 1969, Prime Minister Milton Obote announced that he
had assumed "all the powers" of the government of Uganda. Prior to this
time, Obote had done extensive travelling on the African and Asian conti
nents discussing methods whereby Africans could effectively deal with the
eradication of imperialism on the continent.
On February 13, 1965, Obote charged that Congolese planes, supplied
by the United States had bombed two villages in Uganda. He further charged
that the U. S. was trying to set up puppet governments in Africa. A clear
example of what he called neo-colonialism. Obote further remarks that
"If America thinks she can rule the world by violating others' territorial
Silverburg, .Ojj. cit., p. 75.
7Jbid., p. 75.
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integrity and independence she is not a democracy, she is ruled by gang-
o
sters prepared to disturb world peace."
In May of that same year, Obote disclosed that Yugoslavia and Com
munist China had made promises of loans and gifts to Uganda totaling 25.2
million. Two months later, while on an official visit to the People's
Republic of China, he talked with Chairman Mao tse-Tung and Head of State
Lui Shoa-Chi. Obote revealed that Uganda would open an embassy in Peking
before the end of 1965 and further reiterated his ambitions for the end
of imperialism. In sum, Obote was making friends with the sworn enemies
of Western imperialism and was consistently moving Uganda towards the
"socialist camp" in its development. The results of such behavior were
to prove fatal to the Obote regime.
Sworn in as President of Uganda on April 15, 1966, Obote accelerated
his pace to expel and expose imperialism and capitalism in Uganda. Under
his rule, Obote had wished to bring the Ugandan economy under stronger state
control. Thus, by 1969, he issued a "Common Man's Charter", which pro
posed tighter state control of the economy and, if necessary, nationaliza*-
tion of production and distribution. Commenting on the very nature of the
"Common Man*s Charter", Obote stated that the move to the left involved a
new political culture and a new way of life whereby the people as a whole
are paramount. He also warned that it was dangerous to allow a widening
gap between the rich and poor in Uganda. According to Obote, the move to
the left did not represent a strong ideological shift but it did reflect
two things. First an attempt to bind together the different Ugandan tribes,
8New York Hearld Tribune, February 14, 1965.
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peoples and religions into a nation and secondly, the recognition that
economic progress in isolation is not necessarily a desirable goal, par-
ticuiarly if it is achieved at the expense of political independence.
Uganda was moving forward towards the goals of equal distribution of
national income and economic and social development for the total nation.
"In short", comments one author on Uganda, "Uganda has been having an
industrial escalation that would eventually move the society into a new
material culture. . . . Expectations were heightened in July 1970,
when the Minister of Mineral and Water Resources, Mr. M. L. Chandry, told
Parliament in Kampala that, 'Rich deposits of very high quality vermi-
culite magnetite, iron, columbite, tantalite, salt and tin had been dis
covered in different parts of Uganda. Copper, diamonds and wolfram were
also being suspected in parts of Karimoja.'"
On the whole, the entire sphere of the Uganda economy was prospering
for the total population. By May 1, 1970, President Obote had announced
a government takeover of certain sections of the Ugandan economy. The
areas which were to take immediate effect, included the nationalization
of the import and export trade, with the exception of imports of oil and
petroleum products. The government acquired a 60 percent share in all
manufacturing and plantation industries, banks, oil companies, and the
Kilembe copper mines. Obote said that the various measures he was an
nouncing were those necessary for the promotion of Uganda's new political
^"Uganda," Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1972, p. 35.
10Pete M. Gukiina, Uganda: A Case Studv in African Political Devel




culture as set out in the Common Man's Charter.
To merely state that Western powers were unhappy with the "progres
sive nature" of the Obote regime is an understatement. What the results
of this disapproval would mean can only be traced to the alleged clear-
cut plan on the part of these powers with the direct help of the Zionist
State to topple the Obote government.
Idi Amin and the Ugandan Coup
Serving as Army Commander Brigadier, Idi Amin Dada, a British
trained officer, stressed that the armed forces were strongly behind
President Obote and had no ambition for a political role.
Initially, Amin's relations with Obote were close. He was an attrac
tive army commander because, like Obote, he had northern tribal origins,
and in fact one of Amin's four wives was from Obote1s tribe. Throughout
his military career, Amin avoided politics and was virtually unknown to
the United Nations and diplomatic groups in Kampala, the nation's capital.
But as Obote moved to the left, Amin's conservative views put him at odds
with the President.
Subsequent efforts by Obote to draw tribal groups together and con
solidate the armed forces behind the national policy also served to
heighten support for Amin, who up until this time was calling for "reform"
in government. Basically, the pro-Amin theory is that Dr. Obote had
ordered Lango and Acholi troops, those of proven loyalty to Obote, to dis
arm and shoot if necessary, all other soldiers.13 Amin, was supposedly
12"llnanHa." Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1971, p. 37.
13Norman N. Miller, Military Coup in Uganda, American Universities
Field Staff, East Africa Series, Vol. X, No. 3 (April, 1971), 5.
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included on the list of those to be shot. This theory points to long-
festering tribal animosities within the Ugandan army.
However, the total disenchantment that Obote felt for Amin soon be
came public. Even worse were the attempts by Obote to weaken the General's
power; which were viewed in Ugandan circles as unpopular. When the sit
uation deteriorated to an apparent overt move to get rid of Amin, it was
the General's friends in the military who tipped the balance. Uganda's
enlisted men and NCO's essentially seized power and handed it to the
General.
Therefore, on January 25, 1971, the Ugandan army units under the
command of Major General Idi Amin seized control of the government in the
absence of President Obote. Obote, who was attending the Commonwealth of
Nations Conference in Singapore at the time of the coup, was granted asylum
in Dar-es-Saiaam, Tanzania. Kampala radio announced that the army had
taken power because it was thoroughly dissatisfied with Obote1s economic
policy and with corruption and tribalism in government.
The day after the coup, soldiers of the Armed Forces broadcasted the
reasons why they took over the country. These included such things as
civil violence, high taxes and the total lack of political freedom and
expression. The broadcast then continued:
For the reasons given above we men of the Ugandan Armed
Forces have this day decided to take over powers from Obote
and hand it to our fellow soldier Major General Idi Amin Dada
and we hereby entrust him to lead this our beloved country of
Uganda to peace and goodwill among us.
We call upon everybody. . .to continue with their work in
the normal way.
For the moment a curfew is necessary . . .
Power is now handed over to our fellow soldier, Major
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General Idi Amin Dada, and you must await his state
ment which will come in due course.
14
We have done this for God and our country.
By February 2, Amin announced that as military head of state he had
assumed all powers formerly held by the President and the Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. Diplomatic recognition from reactionary Afri
can nations and the Western powers followed within a matter of days.
Israel and The Coup
Dr. Obote, speaking from Tanzania on the day after the Coup announced
that the takeover had been manned by foreigners and he accused Israel of
being involved.15 To counter the accusation an Israeli government spokes
man in Jerusalem strongly denied that his country was involved. "This is
absolute nonsense, Israel has never interfered in the internal affairs of
any country", he said.
Israel's compliance in the Coup, as charged by Obote was continuously
denied by both Israel officials and those close to the new Ugandan regime.
However, facts bear out that there was, in the first three days after the
Coup, heavy reliance on Israeli advisers by Ugandan soldiers.
One observer of the situation claimed to have first hand knowledge
of the direct involvement of Israel in the Ugandan Coup. Peter Anyang'
Nyong1 0, stated that he witnessed Israeli embassy cars carrying soldiers
into the town of Kampala soon after the 'Coup1 and Israeli military per
sonnel cruising with the leader of that reactionary 'Coup' into the
iZfIbid., pp. 1-2.
15"Uganda: Coup d' etat," Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 8, Janu




It might be suggested in passing that the Israeli aid to the military
in Uganda had indeed proved to be self-serving for the Israelis on the
one hand and the entire imperialist bloc on the other. Touching at the
very heartstrings of European domination, Amin announced that he would
remain in the Commonwealth of Nations. He further delighted Great Britain
and other Western powers in stating that his government would slow down
the previous government's plan for nationalization of industry and commerce.
Amin consolidated his position with the Israelis by promising his
support for continued Israeli presence in Uganda. For it has been re
ported that:
While the Ugandan government in the United Nations and
elsewhere followed the Organization of African Unity in
its policies toward the Middle East conflict, Amin insis
ted that his junior officers be trained in Israel. He
insisted that the Israeli instructors and advisers be
retained by the army and air force.'°
While visiting Tel Aviv in July 1971, President Amin talked with
Israelis about expanding Israeli development and military aid in Uganda.
It was generally understood that Amin was mainly interested in increasing
the effectiveness of the air force.
Reactions to the coup from African nations were diverse. Pro-Western
nations such as Liberia, Malawi and the Ivory Coast wasted no time in
applauding Amin in his successful overthrow of the Obote regime. On the
17Peter Anyang1 Nyong1 0. "The Impact of the Palestine and Arab
Israeli Conflict on African Orientations and Behavior," Paper presented
at the Sixth Annual Convention of Association of Arab American University




other hand, responses from''progressive" African nations were to the con
trary. President Nyerere of Tanzania strongly condemned the seizure of
power by Amin and stated: "This is an act of treason which impedes the
African progress towards independence, and which, if allowed to consoli
date itself, could weaken Uganda's national independence, and the strength
of this whole region at a time when even a fool is aware of the need for
Africa to unite in a battle against colonialism and racialism.* Presi
dent Sekou Toure of Guinea stated that the Guinean Government was "angry
at the actions by elements in the service of imperialism .... The
satisfaction voiced by imperialist powers through their press is proof
20
of their complicity."
Up until February, 1972, the honeymoon between Amin and Israel was
at its best. However, events after this period were to alter the entire
scope of Israeli aid to Uganda on the one side and to all of Africa on the
other.
Amin and the Expulsion of the Israelis
By February, 1972, Amin's attitudes towards the Israelis had turned
full circle. Amin informed the Israeli ambassador to Uganda that the
government had received allegations that Israelis in Uganda had been
spreading anti-government propaganda. He also informed them that he had
uncovered a plot by the Israelis to establish contacts with former Presi
dent Obote and his followers. Consequently, Amin announced that existing
19"Uganda: Coup" ...» Africa Research Bulletin, p. 1995.
20Ibid., p. 1996.
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Israeli-Ugandan Agreements (trade, development and military) would not
be renewed. He ordered all Israeli military advisers to leave Uganda
before March 27. On March 30, he closed the Israeli embassy in Kampala.
Amin stated that the government had uncovered an anti-government plot
21
which involved top-level Ugandan officers and Israeli agents. On the
exodus of the Israelis from Uganda, Amin distinguished himself by openly
applauding Hitler's slaughter of six million Jews in Germany.
In the final analysis, it is somewhat difficult to assess Amin's
change in attitude towards the Israelis. On one account, Amin was not
the pawn that the Israelis felt he could be in Africa. In other words,
the Israelis were looking for forces in Africa which they could directly
use to their advantage: Idi Amin was not that force.
Another reason for his actions could have been his background. Amin
is a devout Moslem. And while it became clearer to him that Israeli aid
could be replaced by Libyan or Egyptian aid, the Israelis failed to
realjze this factor.
A third factor, which is of equal importance, was the overall atti
tude that African leaders were beginning to take in regards to Israel and
the Middle East War. While in the past, African nations regarded the
Middle East as an "outside matter", after 1967 Israel was viewed in
African eyes as "the aggressor" in the conflict.
The Beaumont Enterprise, gives an interesting account of what could
have been a fourth reason behind General Amin's expulsion of the Israelis.
According to Arthur Gavshon, the situation involved the British, the
Israelis and Amin:
Israeli and British diplomats tell a surprising story about
21"Uganda," Deadline Data, p. 32.
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the tempestuous ruler of Uganda, Maj. Gen. Idi Amin.
The onetime national boxing champion who has become a dictator
asked each of those countries for the planes, tanks and guns he
needed to conquer neighboring Tanzania.
Both the Israelis and the British—who were among his best
friends when he ousted Milton Obote as president 27 months
ago—refused what they considered to be a wild request.
And so, in his own good time, he turned on them, the diplo
mats say.22
Explaining that Amin had never forgiven the Tanzanians for giving
asylum to Obote; Gavshon goes on to discuss that Amin was building up
his arms for a confrontation with the Tanzanians.
Among Amin's requests to the Israelis and the British was one for
the American-built Phantom jet fighter, which no Ugandan is trained to
23
fly. From the British he wanted combat jet aircraft to enable him to
2k
bomb Dar-es-Salaam.
At any rate, any one or a combination of the above reasons, could
have been directly behind Amin's decision to get rid of the Israelis.
After all, Uganda served as a model for African nations wishing to dismiss
imperialist aggressors from the continent. From 1972 up until the pre
sent time, the Israelis are being dismissed from African nations at a
rapid rate. Although not acclaiming their disapproval of the Israelis at
the level that General Amin has done, many African leaders have turned
their backs on the trade and aid that was once lavished upon them by the
Zionists.
22
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There are three distinct factors which become evident after an
analysis of the Israeli aid programmes to Ghana and Uganda in particular
and to the Third World in general.
1. There were significant differences in the approaches used
by Israel in Ghana as opposed to Uganda. In other words,
distinct roles were played by Ghana and Uganda in Israel's
policy formation for Africa.
2. A large level of stabilization was given to Israel's foreign
relations with Third World nations while she was dispensing
aid to Africa.
3. African nations' total rejection of Israeli aid in the early
1970's reflected negatively on the total image of Israel
in the Third World.
First of all, it should be understood that Ghana and Uganda played
different roles in the Israeli foreign policy structure. True, both
nations were viewed as strong "African allies," but as Israel began to
push her pro-Zionist propaganda in Africa her position began to change
vis-a-vis most African states.
In the case of Ghana, Israel's primary goals were at the outset poli-
tical and economical. The mere fact that Ghana, the first African state
to gain independence from colonial rule had turned to Israel for ad
vice and assistance was an occurrence the significance of which was not
lost to most Africans. In addition, after the Israeli consulate in Ghana
was elevated to the level of embassy; it became Israel's first embassy in
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all of Afro-Asia and only the eighth maintained by Israel abroad.
It appears certain that Ghana's close relations with Israel afforded
the Zionists a political partner and a forum, both of which were needed
in Africa. Israel was more than happy to show her appreciation for the
close ties and consistently showered Ghana with one of the most extensive
aid programmes ever to be established in Africa. The Israelis treated
Ghana to the cream of its technical aid crop. And the Ghanaians recipro
cated by giving Israel its calling card to Africa. Consequently, when
the Ghanaian delegation to Israel arrived in Tel Aviv, the Israeli press
hailed the delegation and commented:
The visit comes like the sudden discovery of a fresh spring
of the cool water of common sense and practical idealism in
the barren desert of prejudice, irrational hates and blind-
alley politics which vitiates so much that could, be hopeful
in the international scene at the present time.
Israel then, it appears, was concerned with gaining political allies
in Africa. When Ghana opened the doors the Zionists hurriedly shoved
their way through. What the Ghanaians and in particular Nkrumah came to
finally realize was that they had not merely opened the doors for Israel
to Ghana, but to the rest of Africa as well.
The economic aspects of Israeli penetration into Ghana have been
cited in the body of the study. However, Israel's general concern for
trading partners outside the Western world became manifested in finding
friends in Africa. Hence, the Ghana Construction Company and the Black
3
Star Line all proved extremely profitable to Israeli businessmen.
^he others were in the United States, Soviet Union, France, United
Kingdom, Canada, Italy and Argentina.
2Jerusalem Post, July 15, 1957. Cited in Decalo, "Israel and Africa:
The Politics of Co-operation," p. 103.
3The Black Star Line was (on occasion) allowed to pass through the
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As regards Uganda, Israel's motives were not clear. There is still
nothing concrete to prove that the Israelis directly overthrew the Obote
regime. Reports are conflicting, however, it does appear that the Israelis
did play a role.
One could speculate that Isreal was serving Western imperialism by
attempting to oppose Obote and his supporters. However, even this theory
is not well grounded in empirical information. But the implications still
remain. The Israelis were not playing a strong political role in Uganda
as they had done in Ghana. Milton Obote was not Kwame Nkrumah and the
Israelis were cognizant of this fact.
On the other hand, Uganda was both Israel's blessing and its downfall
While no one has seriously attempted to analyze the multifaceted personal
ity of Idi Amin, the Israelis soon came to realize that Amin was not the
force that they were searching for to alter possible Arab and Soviet
elements in Africa.
Israel's campaign in Africa afforded her a period of stability which
was necessary for both her image and survival vis-a-vis the Third World.
While on the one hand, Arab states were calling for the general boycott of
Israeli goods; African nations refused to oppose their newly found mentor.
Israel realized this and rushed to set up aid programmes with every nation
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Subsequently, Africa was seen in Israeli circles as a force which
could also bring direct negotiations between Israeli and the Arab states.
Africa became not only an end in itself, but also a very valuable means
the Suez Canal. Even though the Line was partially owned by Israel.
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to yet another end—peace in the Middle East.
Noting that the friendship between Israel and African nations served
a useful purpose, David Ben Gurion (Israel's first President) stated
that it was:
. . . important and necessary in itself because of its effects
on Israel's international position, but it can also bring about
the weakening and collapse of the Arab wall of hate, and
finally pave the way for a pact of peace and co-operation be
tween Israel and the Arabs.**
On an economic footing, Israel's Ministry of Commerce and Industry
announced the government's intention to actively encourage the formation
of viable export companies aiming their activities at Afro-Asia. The
stated purpose of the move was to help private and public corporations
to gain footholds in Africa and Asia, opening up new markets for Israeli
products.
According to Decalo, "a large amount of the capital needed to finance
both the industrialization and the diversification of the Israeli economy
must come from abroad."6 Therefore, serving as a spring board for its
foreign economic ventures and to possibly curb pro-Arab feeling in Africa,
the Israeli aid programme offered Israel a period of stability in her
world relations which might not have been otherwise afforded to her.
Alternative means of aid can and must be sought for Africa. For
African nations must realize the true interests and nature of the Zionist
%avid Ben Gurion, Israel's Security and Her International Position
Before and After the Sinai Campaign. (Jerusalem: Government Printer,
I960), p. 20.
5Decalo, Israel and Africa: The Politics of Co-operation, p. 28.
6Ibid., p. 30.
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State. As Maxime Rodison has sought to establish
Israel is a colonial-settler state that is in the same
category with other colonial-settler states in Africa,
which states are oppressing African peoples and depleting
their resources. Africa cannot seek to ostracize Rhodesia
while she condones the wickedness of Israel against the
Palestinians.7
In the final nalysis, Israel's strong period in Africa (1959-1971),
was cemented by the image that many African leaders held of Israel.
African states had viewed with sympathy what they saw as a small state
struggling to survive. Israel was linked with Afro-Asia and was con
sidered by many Africans as part of the Third World.
After the 1967 War, 12 Black African states voted for a United Nations
resolution condemning Israel as the aggressor, 16 voted in support of
Israel and 5 remained neutral.
By 1973, the situation for Israel had deteriorated. After the Oct
ober 1973 war, almost all of the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa had broken
diplomatic ties with Israel. The basic reason for this move was the
image that Israel was beginning to have in Africa. That being:
The survival of Israel became identified with American
power. To be opposed to Israel was to be anti—colonialist,
anti-imperialist.10
African defection from Israel is seen also as a result of Arab pres
sure and money. Libya, for example is reported to have promised Uganda
^Maxime Rodison, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York:
Monad Press, 1973), p. 51*.
8"Israel and the African States," Africa Digest. Vol. XXXI, No. 1
(January, 197*0, p. 1.
^This list included such formerly warm friends of Israel as Ethi
opia, Nigeria and Kenya.
10"Israelis Say Black Africans Begin To Regret Breaking Ties," New
York Times, February 17, 197^, p. *♦•
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military and economic assistance.
Once these ties were broken, Israel proclaimed that African leaders
had been misled and that these nations regretted breaking ties with Israel.
In an article written in the New York Times on February 17, 197^, Israeli
officials were quoted as stating that Black African nations were beginning
to have second thoughts about having broken diplomatic relations with
Israel.
As of the present time, none of the 29 African countries have shown
signs of renewing relations with the Zionist state. Although the Israelis
offered to renew relations with any government that asked, no new embas
sies are being opened or old ones reopened in Africa. The Israelis are
anxious to return to African nations and admitted that if asked back
into these nations they would return. Foreign Minister Abba Eban com
mented: "If we go back into Africa, we want to be active, not just sit
there and show the flag."
This statement is evident of the fact that the curtain on Israeli aid
in Africa cannot be drawn. It is also evident of the political nature of
Israeli aid and of the possible consequences for African states which
seek this aid.
However, the analysis contained in this thesis, it is hoped, has shed
some light on the dangers involved in that very dim concept known as "aid".
Although the work might not be inclusive, it makes a first step toward
defining the relationship between the nature of Israeli aid and the impact
of that aid on Africa. In sum, this study has attempted to raise some very
11 Ibid., p. k.
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pertinent questions on the nature of foreign aid in general and the
total realm of Israeli aid to Africa in particular.
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